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i

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the creation of Salt Lake City Justice Court on July 1, 2002, divested the
Third District Court of its original jurisdiction over class B misdemeanor criminal offense
alleged to have occurred and otherwise properly charged in District Court prior to the
establishment of the Justice Court on that same date.

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 14, 2002, Appellant Salt Lake City filed an information in the Third
District Court charging the defendant with issuing a bad check, theft by deception, and
possession of a controlled substance, each of which was alleged to have occurred on May
30, 2001 within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City. Each of the three charges brought
against the defendant was a class B misdemeanor.
On July 1, 2002, Salt Lake City Justice Court was created per constitutional and
legislative prerogatives. After the creation of the Salt Lake City Justice Court, the City
did not file a second information against the defendant in the Justice Court concerning the
same criminal conduct that was previously charged in the February 14, 2002, information
filed in the District Court. While the City continued its original prosecution of the
defendant in District Court, the two-year statutory period for filing an information
charging the same criminal conduct in Salt Lake City Justice Court lapsed.
On August 29, 2008, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the present matter for
lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the creation of the Salt Lake City Justice Court divested
Utah Third District Court of jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors alleged to have
occurred within Salt Lake City limits.
The Honorable Deno Himonas heard oral arguments on this motion from the City
and the defendant on October 22, 2008, and entered a final order of dismissal of charges
against the defendant on the same day finding that the Third District Court lacked
jurisdiction. The City now appeals Judge Himonas' final order of dismissal.

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court should not have found that it lacked jurisdiction. The matter was
commenced with a proper filing of an information, which vested original subject matter
jurisdiction in the District Court. The Salt Lake City Justice Court did not come into
existence until five months after the information was filed. Nothing in the statute creating
the Salt Lake City Justice Court divested the District Court of its jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
Because this is a question of law, this court should review the trial court's
conclusions for correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court's decision.
See State v. Norris, 2007 UT 6, f 10,152 P.3d 293.
I.THE ORIGINAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION THAT VESTED WITH
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT WITH THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION
ON FEBRUARY 14, 2002 CANNOT BE WAIVED.
A court must have jurisdiction to legally have the authority to adjudicate a
controversy. Utah's Constitution establishes district courts as the trial courts of general
jurisdiction "hav[ing] original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this
constitution or by statute." UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 5. Jurisdiction over a particular
subject matter is derived from the law, James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998), and must be invoked in the manner as designated by applicable statute and
procedural requirements. State v. Telford, 72 P.2d 626 (Utah 1937). Once invoked,
jurisdiction vests and cannot be waived. James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d at 570.
A.

The matter was properly commenced, and jurisdiction vested, with the
filing of an Information in the Third District Court.

2

Utah law is clear that jurisdiction must be invoked according to a certain
procedure. Hakki v. Faux, 396 P.2d 867 (Utah 1964). This is accomplished by the filing
of an information or indictment. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 4 and 5 (2001), UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-1-3 (2001) (defining "information"), UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2-1.1 (2001)
(requirements for signing and filing of the information), UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2-2(3)
(2001) (definition of "'Commencement of prosecution' means the filing of an
information or an indictment). Filing is accomplished in the court that has original
jurisdiction as determined by statute.
In Hakki, the main issue before the Court was whether the district court had proper
jurisdiction over the misdemeanor matter when the prosecution had commenced with the
filing of a complaint in contravention to statute that required an information or
indictment. 396 P.2d at 868. The Court found that the statutes and case authority clearly
established the proper procedure. Id. citing State v. Telford, 72 P.2d at 627; see also State
v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1040 (Utah 1941) (finding that "[s]ince the Legislature has
laid down a certain procedure for invoking the jurisdiction of the district courts this
procedure must be followed). Because this procedure was not followed, the trial court
was prohibited from continuing with the scheduled trial. Hakki, 396 P.2d at 869. Although
the judicial scheme in 2001 and at present does not utilize justices of the peace as
understood by the Hakki and previous appellate courts, similar procedural requirements
to prosecution and thus subject matter jurisdiction of the district court do apply. When the
information was filed against Mr. Weiner on February 14, 2002 in the Third District
Court, jurisdiction vested in the Third District Court as the court of original jurisdiction
over the matter. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(8) (2001).
3

B. Once jurisdiction vested with the Third District Court, the trial court
should not have found that jurisdiction could be waived.
Once a court's jurisdiction has been invoked, there is a strong presumption against
divesting that court of its jurisdiction. See Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15,
89 P.3d 113. In Labelle v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, the Court was asked to determine
whether plaintiffs failure to mail a copy of the request for a prelitigation hearing as
required by the Medical Malpractice Act affected the district court's subject matter
jurisdiction. 2004 UT 15, Tf 6. Despite plaintiffs failure to comply with this provision, the
Court found that the district court's subject matter jurisdiction was not affected because
the mailing requirement is a "minor component of the Malpractice Act's prelitigation
scheme" and failure to comply may warrant a sanction but does not act divest the district
court of jurisdiction. Id. at ^| 17.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized and relied on well established
policies against divestiture of jurisdiction as it looked at the plain language of the
Medical Malpractice Act under which jurisdiction was established. Id. at \ 8 n.2 (noting
that "Other states have articulated a similar principle." See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 788
P.2d 1178, 1181 (Ariz. 1990) (stating that "a presumption exists in favor of [a district
court's] retention of jurisdiction, and divestiture . . . cannot be inferred but must be
clearly and unambiguously found"); State v. Villados, 520 P.2d 427, 430 (Haw. 1974)
(holding that "the law in favor of [divestment of a court's jurisdiction] must be clear and
unambiguous"); Paly v. Coca Cola Co., 209 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Mich. 1973) (quoting 19th
century Michigan State Supreme Court case that "the law in favor of [divesting a court of
jurisdiction] must be clear and unambiguous . . . and leave nothing for the play of doubt
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and uncertainty) (internal citations omitted)). This Court should recognize similar
policies against divestiture of jurisdiction in the present case.
Additionally, and contrary to the trial court's conclusion in the present matter,
jurisdiction "can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused." James v.
Galetka, 965 P.2d at 570. In that case this Court was asked to determine whether a statute
of limitations bar may be waived with a guilty plea. In coming to the conclusion that
statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional and may therefore be waived, this Court
recognized a distinction between jurisdictional issues that could not be waived and
nonjurisdictional issues that may be waived. Id. at 570. Subject matter jurisdiction may
not be waived because it is a purely jurisdictional issue. Id. However, issues such as an
accused's "right to a jury trial, right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against
self-incrimination" and statutes of limitations are all nonjurisdictional issues that may be
waived. Id. This distinction was not made at the trial court level when a defendant's
variety of Sixth Amendment rights were considered to be analogous to the issue of
jurisdiction. Transcript of Record, Utah Third District Court, Oct. 22, 2008, at page 6:107:4, Salt Lake City v. Weiner (021902227). However, the law as argued by the City at the
motion hearing below that under a plain reading of text of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which text only refers to jurisdiction as "which district shall
have previously been ascertained by law", the general rule is that once jurisdiction has
vested, no subsequent fact would defeat it, which comports with the ruling in James v.
Galetka. Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Salt Lake City v. Weiner
(021902227), Court of Appeals File at 29.

5

In addition to improperly including jurisdiction under Sixth Amendment rights
that a defendant may waive, the trial court may also have mixed the legal issues of
jurisdiction and an accused's privilege regarding venue. Utah law provides clear guidance
as to what a trial court should consider in granting or denying a request for change of
venue. See State v. James, 161 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989); Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, 175
P.3d 530; State v. Stubbs, 2005 UT 65, 123 P.3d 407 (overruling State v. Stubbs, 2004
UT App 3); State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 28 P.3d 1278. However, because venue is not
applicable to the present appeal nor to the decision of the trial court below, this Court
need not consider Utah's law regarding change of venue.
Because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the defendant, the only other way that
divestiture of jurisdiction in the present matter would be accomplished is through clear
and unambiguous language of the statute establishing the jurisdiction of the justice court
to include such pending matters in the district court. See People v. Veling, 504 N. W.2d
456 n.13 (Mich. 1993) (citing Leo v. Atlas Indus., Inc. ,121 NW2d 926 (Mich. 1963)).
II.AS A MATTER OF LAW THE DISTRICT COURT WAS THE ONLY
JUDICIAL FORUM THAT HAD COMPETENT SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE AT THE TIME THAT IT WAS FILED,
AND THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT SUCH JURISDICTION
WAS DIVESTED BY THE CREATION OF THE SALT LAKE CITY JUSTICE
COURT AT A LATER DATE.
Appellant's prosecution of the defendant in present the matter was initiated on
February 14, 2002, with the Appellant's filing of a formal information in Utah Third
District Court charging the defendant with issuing a bad check, theft by deception, and
possession of a controlled substance, Class B Misdemeanor criminal offenses alleged to
have occurred on May 30,2001 within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, Utah. At
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the time the information was filed in the present matter, the district court had "original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(1) (2001). This broad jurisdiction was
limited, however, under the statutory scheme of the Judicial Code, which, at the time of
filing, provided that Utah's District Courts have subject matter jurisdiction in class B
misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the
district courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed a justice
court; or
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal
episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-3-4(8) (2001).

On July 1, 2002, the Salt Lake City Justice Court was created under the
constitutional prerogative of Article VIII, §1 of the Utah Constitution and established by
the statutory framework of the then-existing section 78-5-104 of the Utah Code. At the
time of its creation, Salt Lake City Justice Court had "jurisdiction over class B and C
misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and infractions committed within [its] territorial
jurisdiction by a person 18 years of age or older." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-104(1)
(2001). After the establishment of the Salt Lake City Justice Court, the Appellant did not
file a second information in the Justice Court against the defendant in this matter
concerning the same criminal conduct that was previously charged in the February 14,
2002, information filed in the District Court.
Examining the plain meaning of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4 (2001), it seems clear
that the District Court had jurisdiction over this matter when it was filed in 2002. The
7

Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed and articulated long-standing principles of
statutory construction when it explained that,
Under our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's plain
language to determine its meaning. We read [t]he plain language of a statute . . . as
a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same
statute and with other statutes under the same and related chapters. We do so
because a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated
by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be
construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a
harmonious whole.
State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15,1(10 (quoting Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, If 7, 162 P.3d 1099).
In this case, there appears to be little or no question1 concerning the meaning of §
78-3-4: Utah's District Courts maintain original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. This
jurisdiction does not extend, however, to class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors,
infractions, and violations of ordinances unless specified conditions are met under the
terms of § 78-3-4(8). Because no Justice Court existed within the territorial jurisdiction of
Salt Lake City on February 14, 2002, it is apparent that at the time that this case was
filed, there existed a condition recognized under the plain language of § 78-3-4(8)(a)
giving the District Court jurisdiction over the class B misdemeanors charged in this case.
Moreover, because Salt Lake City had not established a justice court pursuant to the
framework of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-104 (2001) - a chapter of the Code which
outlines the jurisdiction of municipal justice courts and is intimately intertwined with and
related to § 78-3-4, the chapter of the Code which outlines the jurisdiction of District

1

Indeed, in the course of making its decision below, the District Court noted that it was a fact stipulated between the
parties that the District Court had jurisdiction over the present case at the time of its initial filing. See Transcript of
Record, Utah Third District Court, Oct. 28, 2009, at page 7:8, Salt Lake City v. Weiner (021902227).
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Courts - there existed no competent tribunal within the territorial jurisdiction of Salt
Lake City which had subject matter jurisdiction under the Utah Code to adjudicate the
class B misdemeanors charged in the present case other than the District Court.
However, in the course of making its decision below, the District Court
determined that the dispositive issue was not whether it had jurisdiction over the present
matter in the first instance, but rather whether its jurisdiction applied to the case
"retroactively." The Court held that, "In fact, jurisdictional changes are viewed as taking
away no substantive right, but simply changing the tribunal that's to hear the case and are
largely construed as procedural. As a consequence, the presumption against retroactivity
does not apply and [the statute giving subject matter jurisdiction over class B
misdemeanors to the Justice Court] does apply retroactively." Transcript of Record, Utah
Third District Court, Oct. 22, 2008, at page 7:11-16, Salt Lake City v. Weiner
(021902227). Based on its determination that the jurisdictional statute giving the Justice
Courts subject matter jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors applied to this matter
retroactively, the Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the present
matter and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the case.
The District Court's analysis on this particular point is puzzling because the
District Court's reliance on the notion of the "retroactivity" of the statutory framework
seems misplaced. The appellant does not question the applicability of the statutory
framework giving Justice Courts subject matter jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors to
the facts of this case. Indeed, under the plain terms of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-104
(2001), where applicable, Justice Courts clearly had jurisdiction over class B
misdemeanors under the scheme Utah's Judicial Code at the time that this matter was
9

initially filed in District Court in February 2002. Accordingly, the terms of § 78-5-104 do
not apply retroactively to the facts of this case because they already applied
concomitantly to the facts of this case at its inception. For all legal purposes, nothing in
the statutory framework governing the subject matter jurisdiction of our State's various
courts over class B misdemeanors substantively changed between February 14, 2002,
when this case was initially filed and October 22, 2008, when the District Court issued its
decision dismissing this case.
This matter was initially filed in District Court because, as was explained above,
on February 14, 2002, there existed a condition recognized under the plain language of §
78-3-4(8)(a) giving the District Court jurisdiction over the class B misdemeanors charged
in this case: namely that no justice court created pursuant to the Utah Constitution and §
78-5-104 (2001) existed within the territorial jurisdiction of Salt Lake City. As no other
competent tribunal had both territorial and subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the
class B misdemeanors charged by the appellant in February 2002, under the Utah Judicial
Code, the District Court was the only proper forum in which the present matter could or
should have been filed by the appellant.
Understood in these terms, the District Court's focus on the concept of
"retroactivity" would appear to have no bearing on the disposition of jurisdictional issues
related to the appellant's prosecution of this case. Notably, the District Court's decision
offers no explanation as to why an obvious condition precedent giving the Court subject
matter jurisdiction over this case at the time of its filing ceases to be applicable merely
because such a condition precedent would not have existed had the case been filed at a
later date. No basis in law or fact has been stated for the proposition that the creation of
10

the Salt Lake City Justice Court in July 2002 rendered the jurisdiction of the District
Court over cases filed pursuant to § 78-3-4(8) void. First, the plain language of the
Judicial Code does not appear to support such a conclusion. In addition to the previously
discussed provisions of § 78-3-4(8)(a), § 78-3-4(8)(c) provided that District Courts have
jurisdiction over Class B misdemeanors when "the offense occurred within the
boundaries of the municipality in which the district courthouse is located and that
municipality has not formed a justice court." This language plainly indicates that District
Court subject matter jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors exists where a case is filed
in a municipality that has not formed a justice court.
The language of the applicable statutes governing the subject matter jurisdiction of
District and Justice Courts gives no indication - either as the statutes were written in
2002 or as they are written today - of the Legislature's specific intent to dispose of cases
properly filed in District Court prior to the creation of a justice court in a given
municipality. No language in any Utah statute can be read or construed to strip or
otherwise divest Utah's District Courts of their jurisdiction to adjudicate class B
misdemeanors properly filed pursuant to § 78-3-4(8)(a) and/or § 78-3-4(8)(c) simply
because a municipality subsequently creates a Justice Court with the subject jurisdiction
to adjudicate such matters as may be filed by a prosecuting entity in the future. No
statutory language exists indicating that such matters should be dismissed by a District
Court and refiled in an appropriate Justice Court, and no language exists providing for the
transfer of such cases from District Court to newly formed Justice Courts. Similarly, no
decisional law indicates that District Courts lose their jurisdiction to hear such cases.
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The legislative history of the former UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(8) is instructive to
the analysis here. Prior to 1998, the Legislature provided for a specific limitation of time
in which District Courts had jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3-4(8) (1997) ("Notwithstanding Subsection (1), between July 1, 1997, and
July 1, 1998, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors . . .
only if: .. ."). This language was removed by the 1998 Legislature in House Bill 460, and
subsequent versions of § 78-3-4(8) provided District Courts subject matter over class B
misdemeanors subsequent to the fulfillment of certain conditions precedent without
making any reference to a specific time period in which such jurisdiction could vest. See
1998 Utah Laws 313 ( "Notwithstanding Subsection (1), between July 1, 1997, and July
1, 1998, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors . . .
only i f : . . . " ) . This change evinces a recognition on the part of the Legislature that the
subject matter jurisdiction of District Courts vis-a-vis § 78-3-4(8) could be cabined within
specific allocations of time if the Legislature so intended (as was the case prior to the
1998 statutory amendment in House Bill 460). However, the fact that the Legislature
specifically chose to remove such time limitations on District Court subject matter
jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors in its amendments to the Judicial Code in 1998 is
evocative of an intent that such jurisdiction be limited only by the requirement that one or
more of the conditions precedent outlined in § 78-3-4(8)(a)-(d) be fulfilled prior to such
jurisdiction being invoked in District Court.
The District Court's conclusion that the creation of the Salt Lake City Justice
Court divested it of jurisdiction to adjudicate the present matter is without basis. The
alternative conclusion - that jurisdiction vests at the time of filing and does not terminate
12

without some sort of Legislative action to the contrary - is supported by a plain language
reading of the terms of the relevant statutes.
Though not dispositive of the issue at hand, it bears noting that District Court
adjudication of other matters filed in Third District Court pursuant to § 78-3-4(8) prior to
the creation of the Salt Lake City Justice Court has continued routinely and without
controversy from July 2002 to the present day. No statutory mechanism exists by which
currently pending matters that were properly filed in District Court pursuant to § 78-34(8) prior to July 2002 (for which the applicable statutes of limitation for -re-filing have
now presumably lapsed) could be transferred or refilled in Salt Lake City Justice Court.
Affirmation of the decision below would create an unjust and absurd unsettling of the
expectations and routine practice of the appellant in this matter.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should reverse the trial court's final order of
dismissal based on the finding that it lacked jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of April, 2009.
SIMARJIT S. GILL
Salt Lake City Prosecutor

v/^Ii^
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ADDENDUM A

Utah Constitution, article VIII, § 5.
[Jurisdiction of district court and other courts ~ Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed
originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the
court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (2001)
§ 78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the
rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the circuit court
prior to July 1, 1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de novo of the
judgments of the justice court and of the small claims department of the district court.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court are under
Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review:
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, in
its review of agency adjudicative proceedings; and
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3-703.7.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in

class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances
only if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the district
courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed a justice court; or
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal episode
alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1997)
§ 78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the
rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the circuit court
prior to July 1, 1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de novo of the
judgments of the justice court and of the small claims department of the district court.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court are under
Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency adjudicative proceedings as set
forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), between July 1, 1997, and July 1, 1998, the district
court has subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors,
infractions, and violations of ordinances only if:

(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the district
courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed a justice court; or
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal episode
alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104 (2001)
§ 78-5-104. Jurisdiction
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of
ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction, except those
offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims cases under Title 78, Chapter 6, Small
Claims Courts, if the defendant resides in or the debt arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of the justice court.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

(Transcriber's Note:

Speaker identification

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

MS. HUNT:
THE COURT:
MS. HUNT:

Good morning, your Honor.
Start off with an interesting one.
Yes.

case--the Weiner case.

Would you please call the Weiner

Sorry, I've mispronounced it.

THE COURT: All right.
THE CLERK:
MS. HUNT:
THE COURT:
MS. HUNT:
THE COURT:
MS. HUNT:
THE COURT:
MS. HUNT:
THE COURT:
MS. HUNT:
of jurisdiction.

What's the last name?
Weiner.
W-e-i-n-It's No. 15 on the calendar.
Okay.

Where's your client?

He's not here.
Okay.

He was excused.

Are you ready to proceed?

Yes.
Go right ahead.
Your Honor, I'd move to dismiss for lack

At the time the case was filed, there was no

justice court, but shortly after it was filed, one came into
existence and I believe that under our statutory scheme, this
Court no longer has jurisdiction over this Class B misdemeanor
3

1 1 case.
2
3

THE COURT:
procedural right?

4

MS. HUNT:

5

THE COURT:

6

9
10

I believe it's substantive.
If it's substantive, then, doesn't the

presumption against* retroactivity apply?

7
8

Is jurisdiction a substantive or

MS. HUNT:

I have no idea, I haven't researched

that.
I think Utah law, if you've had a chance to look at
the memos--

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. HUNT:

I--I've-You're right on top of all this, you're

13

way ahead of me.

14

legislative has the authority to create conditions that have

15

jurisdiction.

16
17

I just think Utah law reflects that the

THE COURT:

Clearly.

There--there's no question

about that, it certainly applies.

18

MS. HUNT:

19

THE COURT:

Uh huh (affirmative) .
But it seems to me the question that

20

wasn't addressed in the memos is, one, okay, now we have the

21

statute that applies, but like many other statutory changes,

22

the question becomes whether the changes are retroactive and

23

apply to pending--

24

MS. HUNT:

25

THE COURT:

Uh huh (affirmative).
--cases or not.

And the--

MS. HUNT:
THE COURT:

Uh huh (affirmative).
--the presumption is typically against

retroactivity with exceptions being for amendments that are
procedural versus substantive, but if a substantive right is-is affected, then absent clear direction from the legislature,
the statutory presumption (inaudible) statutes is it doesnft
apply.
MS. HUNT:

I think Ifm going to have to research

that and brief it for you, I don't know right off the top of
my head.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Ifm giving--I think I do, but I'm

giving you a hard time about it.
MS. HUNT:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Okay.

Who's going to argue for the City?
MS. WILLIAMSON:

Your Honor, I don't know that I

have--I--and I didn't address the retro--retroactivity
question either, and I don't know that I have a lot to add to
what I have written.

And the Constitution says that the

juris--basically the jurisdiction means (inaudible) prior to
it-THE COURT:

Well, the Constitution--

MS. WILLIAMSON:
THE COURT:

--being met--

--kinda says something a little

different from that, but doesn't--! mean, isn't that the
5

defendant's right-MS. WILLIAMSON:
THE COURT:

Sure.

--under the Sixth Amendment?

MS. WILLIAMSON:

Sure.

It's not--

But it could go either way

if we-THE COURT:

No.

MS. WILLIAMSON:

--were--I mean, if--if we don't

look at it as being previously ascertained, then we could
change it to a place more favorable or less favorable.
THE COURT:

Well, just help me out, though.

The--

the Sixth Amendment provides a number of rights of the
defendant, including the right to be represented by counsel;
right?
MS. WILLIAMSON:
THE COURT:

And a speedy public trial?

MS. WILLIAMSON:
THE COURT:

Correct.

Sure.

And we let defendants waive those rights

whenever they want.
MS. WILLIAMSON:
THE COURT:

True.

But in this position, where the

defendant wants to waive this right, it is the City's position
that he can't?
MS. WILLIAMSON:

Well, the City's position is that--

because there was simply no other place for this case to be
filed, that it was properly filed here and it was not
£

1

(inaudible) that court did not (inaudible) that--that crime;

2

but that it didn't divest this Court of the jurisdiction

3

except for cases that meant after that date.

4

condition.

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. WILLIAMSON:

7
8
9
10
11

That specific

Okay.
And I couldn't find any--any case

law, any rule that would affect (inaudible)
THE COURT:

The--the first question here is whether

the statute, the jurisdictional statute applies at all, and
both parties agree that it does, so that's not a question.
The second is whether it applies retroactively.

In-

12

-in fact, jurisdictional changes are viewed as taking away no

13

substantive right, but simply changing the tribunal that's to

14

hear the case and--and are largely construed as procedural.

15

As a consequence, the presumption against retroactivity does

16

not apply and it does apply retroactively.

17

The--the only question then--or to pending cases, I

18

should say.

19

Constitutional issue as raised by the City.

20

that--I mean, it is the defendant's right to waive the

21

Constitutional argument.

22

to argue, that the Sixth--her Sixth Amendment rights have been

23

violated and it's--you know, it's a little akin to the City

24

arguing speedy trial.

25

The only question is whether there was a
It is odd that--

The defendant here has selected not

As a consequence, the motion is granted, the matter

1

is dismis sed.
Thank you very much, your Honor.

2

MS. HUNT:

3

May I be excused:>

4

THE COURT :

5

That is a really interest:Lng issue--

6

MS. HUNT:

7

THE COURT:

You may.

Yes.
--questions of--similar questions to

8

those being raised by the Supreme Court and Congress' attempt

9

to alter jurisdiction of the Federal Courts with respect to

10

the Guantanamo Bay issue--individuals who--how they can affect

11

jurisdiction of district courts in that, so it's a fascinating

12

question.

13

MS. HUNT:

14

THE COURT:

15

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Thank you.
The motion's granted, case is dismissed.
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